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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of policies to promote the adoption of LEED-certified 
buildings across CBSA in the United States. Drawing upon a unique database that combines 
data from a large number of sources and using a number of regression procedures, the 
determinants of the proportion LEED-certified  space for more than 170 CBSA in the US is 
modeled.  LEED-certified space still accounts for a relatively small proportion of commercial 
stock in all markets.  The average proportion is less than 1%.  There is no conclusive 
evidence of a positive impact of policy intervention on the levels of LEED-certified space. 
However, after accounting for bias introduced by non-random assignment of policies, we find 
preliminary evidence of a positive impact of city-level green building incentives. There is a 
significant positive association between market size and indicators of economic vitality on 
proportions of LEED-certified space.  
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Introduction  
 
Albeit from a low base, over the past decade there has been exponential growth in the number 
of buildings obtaining eco-labels in the United States.  The development of real estate 
eco‐labeling schemes, such as the USGBC‘s LEED rating system and the US EPA‘s Energy 
Star program, has reflected growing awareness of the environmental and social impacts of the 
use and construction of real estate both within the real estate industry and among the general 
public.  Similar shifts are also occurring in many other developed economies.  Following the 
invention and innovation stages, the diffusion of buildings with superior environmental 
performance is critical to reducing the environmental impact of commercial real estate.  
However, despite the increased awareness and understanding of the costs and benefits of 
sustainable design, the distribution of eco-labeled buildings has not been uniform across 
major US cities, In particular, the relative contribution of increasing regulation, growing 
financial incentives and expanding market demand from investors and occupiers remains 
relatively poorly understood.    
 
Focusing particularly on the role of local incentives and regulations, the purpose of this 
research is to investigate spatial variations in the adoption of eco-labeled buildings across the 
US.  As such, the paper explores the locational determinants of eco-labeled buildings across 
cities in the United States. We investigate whether local demand and supply of LEED-
certified buildings is associated with certain market characteristics. The study incorporates 
data on local real estate market characteristics and industry composition in addition to 
demographic and socio‐economic factors.  
 
The Adoption of Eco-labels  
 
Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2005) categorize policies to decrease the environmental impact of 
production and consumption into three types.  Market-based approaches tend to use financial 
incentives to encourage market participants to adopt new technologies and/or change their 
business practices.  Minimum performance standards may also be used to specify maximum 
emissions.  Finally, technology standards may be imposed that require market participants to 
employ particular technologies or processes.  Although it is commonly accepted that market-
based solutions that rely on incentives are likely to be a least costly means of encouraging 
adoption compared to mandatory regulatory approaches, in reality a portfolio of policies is 
often introduced.  State and local governments often use a range of sticks and carrots to 
encourage the diffusion of products and processes that produce superior environmental 
performance.   
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Eco‐labeling of properties is playing a role in promoting the voluntary adoption of more 
environmentally responsible buildings.  For instance, states attempting to improve the 
environmental performance of their building stock often procure themselves and provide 
incentives to buildings with a LEED rating.  The proximate objective of eco-labels is to 
provide information to buyers about products‘ environmental performance in order to 
influence their consumption choices, suppliers‘ production outputs and, consequently, the 
quantity of GHG emissions.  In the commercial real estate market, eco‐labels provide 
information on the environmental performance of a building to investors and tenants.  While 
an eco-label and superior environmental performance are not necessarily synonymous, eco-
labels can be particularly important for credence products, where due to the highs costs to the 
buyer of measuring and monitoring performance, sub-optimal allocation of resources can 
result.  Given the credence good attributes of commercial property, it is typically not possible 
or feasible for market participants to directly measure the desired characteristics, for example 
the degree of energy efficiency of a building.   
 
As discussed above, the mechanism by which environmental labels can produce a net 
environmental improvement is by changes to the relative demand and supply of labeled and 
non-labeled goods.  Assuming that environmental performance is a salient attribute for 
consumers, environmental labeling enables consumers to discriminate between products 
according to their environmental impact resulting in increased demand for products with 
reduced environmental impact and in price differentials for labeled products.    Price 
premiums, in turn, provide an economic incentive for producers to innovate and incur any 
additional production costs associated with obtaining the environmental label.   However, 
since rebound effects are often complex, it can be difficult to quantify impacts on GHG 
emissions. 
 
In many product markets with credence good characteristics, it is common for third parties to 
emerge in order to provide independent verification.  Although eco-labels are usually awarded 
by Not-For-Profit organizations, these organizations have tended to be formed by a synthesis 
of government and private sector actions.  As such, they provide a classic example of 
government intervention to remedy potential market failure and to correct a ―paradox of 
underinvestment‖ (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994).  Voluntary environmental labels can be 
interpreted as a method of reducing the negative externality produced by information 
asymmetry often associated with credence goods.  Of course, market under-provision of 
products with superior environmental performance can occur for other reasons. Slow 
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diffusion of products with superior environmental performance is typically attributed 
imperfect information, split incentives, risk aversion, high discount rates, inherent cost and 
revenue uncertainties and skills shortages inter alia.  However, it is also possible that there is 
no market failure.  Sanstad, Hanemann and Auffhammer (2006) pointed out that many of 
these issues are normal features of markets.  They argue that apparent irrational 
underinvestment may reflect measurement error, the omission of relevant costs and other 
analytical failures.  Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that government policies to 
stimulate demand and supply may foster faster adoption by creating a virtuous circle whereby 
suppliers‘ production costs are reduced by ‗learning by doing‘ and information is generated 
for potential users on the existence, nature and performance of new technologies. 
 
Typically, eco-labels are awarded by a third party to products with a reduced environmental 
impact compared with other products in the same product group. In the US, the two most 
common voluntary programs are LEED and Energy Star.  The LEED Green Building Rating 
System, developed by the U.S. Green Building Council, consists of set of standards for the 
assessment of environmentally sustainable construction.   Similar eco-labeling schemes are 
Green Star (Australia), BREEAM (UK), CASBEE (Japan), Haute Qualité Environnementale 
(France) and Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Nachhaltiges Bauen (Germany). Typically, the rating 
systems focus on six broad categories related to: sustainability of location, water efficiency, 
energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmental quality and innovation 
and design process.   
 
There are different levels of LEED accreditation based upon a scoring founded upon the six 
major categories listed above.  The thresholds are mainly absolute in the sense that all 
buildings put forward that meet the required standards are certified.  In LEED v2.2 for new 
construction and major renovations for commercial premises, buildings may qualify for four 
levels of certification. Certified, Silver, Gold and Platinum.   The Energy Star scheme 
involves an assessment of buildings‘ energy performance.  Buildings are awarded a score out 
of 100.  In contrast to the LEED program, Energy Star is a measure of relative energy 
efficiency and environmental performance.  Only buildings that are in the top quartile of 
buildings put forward are eligible for Energy Star accreditation.  In terms of the US 
commercial real estate market, office properties have tended to dominate both the LEED and 
Energy Star in terms of space and numbers (Nelson, 2007).   
  
There is a substantial body of commentary and evidence that occupiers of and investors in 
buildings with sustainable attributes can obtain a range of benefits.  Most pertinent to this 
paper, owners, developers and occupiers may be eligible for a growing variety of incentives 
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(subsidies, tax reliefs and reduced regulatory barriers) offered in some states and cities.  
Commonly cited benefits to occupiers include reduced utility costs, improved business 
performance (lower staff turnover, absenteeism, higher outputs inter alia) and marketing 
benefits.  Investors may gain from higher occupancy rates, lower utility costs, reduced rates of 
depreciation and protection from regulatory obsolescence.  In turn, it is also expected that 
buildings with superior environmental performance may attract a lower risk premium.  
However, convincing research on some of these benefits e.g. improved productivity, remains 
elusive (Miller, Pogue, Gough and Davis, 2009). 
 
 In the real estate literature, a body of revealed preference studies are emerging that broadly 
confirm occupiers‘ and investors‘ willingness to pay a premium for eco-labeled buildings. 
The majority of these studies have been conducted on LEED Green Building Rating System 
and the Environmental Protection Agency‘s Energy Star system which are two schemes that 
have been developed for the commercial real estate sector in the United States (see Eichholtz, 
Kok and Quigley, 2010, Wiley; Benefield and Johnson, 2010; Fuerst and McAllister, 2011; 
and Miller, Spivey and Florance, 2008).  However, it is important to bear in mind that, given 
the emerging nature of the market shift, sample sizes have typically been small.    In addition, 
price effects are likely to change as supply and demand adjust.  Furthermore, effects may be 
different in residential markets.  A study of the Tokyo residential market finds a significant 
price discount for eco-labeled condominiums (see Yoshida and Suguira, 2011).. 
 
Related Literature 
 
In order to provide some context to our discussion of related research, it is worth highlighting 
some of the methodological issues involved in measuring the impact of policy interventions 
on the diffusion of eco-labeled buildings.  A key issue is controlling for potential confounding 
factors in order to avoid identifying a spurious relationship between market penetration of 
eco-labeled buildings and policy interventions. Cross-sectional econometric models need to 
include possible confounders such as wealth or rates of new supply as covariates.  For 
instance, in wealthy cities there may be more demand for eco-labeled buildings and more 
‗supply‘ of green incentives and regulations.  However, the limitations of a cross-sectional 
analysis due to limited chronological information should be explicitly acknowledged.  Time 
series or panel data enable ‗before-after‘ analyses of policy interventions to be conducted.  It 
is generally considered, although contested, that ‗before-after‘ studies will provide more 
robust inferences regarding causal relationships (see Rubin, 1974).  A further issue is that the 
share of eco‐labeled buildings in the overall commercial real estate market has been changing 
dramatically.  As a result, data tends to become obsolete fairly rapidly.   
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As outlined below, in the United States, more than 50 cities and a growing number of states 
have incorporated standards based on the LEED rating system into their legislation and 
building codes.  One of the first studies analyzing the spatial distribution of eco-labeled 
buildings is Kahn and Vaughn (2009) who use zip code level data in California to investigate 
the spatial distribution of both LEED registered buildings and hybrid vehicles with a view 
towards identifying spatial clusters of "green" consumers. Applying a maximum likelihood 
estimation and a measure of community environmentalism based on revealed preference 
political data, the authors find that ‗green‘ consumers tend to cluster together even when 
controlling for age, race, income, and geographical fixed effects.   
 
Focusing on occupier demand, Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley (2009) focused on the 
components of the occupier demand for eco-labeled offices. Using data on more than 3,100 
tenants in 1,180 eco-labeled office buildings, and on a control sample of approximately 8,000 
tenants in 4,000 conventional office buildings, they suggest that economic composition may 
influence adoption of eco-labeled buildings.  They find that a substantial number of firms in 
the oil and the financial services industry are among the largest occupiers of eco-labeled 
office buildings. Their empirical analysis showed that mining and construction companies, as 
well as government and government-related organizations, are systematically more likely to 
lease eco-labeled office space rather than conventional space when compared to corporate 
tenants in other industries.  All else equal, their analysis suggest that cities with above average 
exposure to these economic sectors are likely to have higher concentrations of eco-labeled 
buildings.  
 
At the state level, Fuerst (2009) examined the distribution of Energy Star and LEED certified 
buildings across the United States.  To equalize size effects among the states and focusing on 
a state rather than metropolitan level, he estimated a ‗location quotient‘ - the ratio of a state‘s 
share in the respective eco-certification program to its population share in total US 
population.  Thus, a quotient larger than 1 indicated that the share of a state in eco-labeling is 
higher than its population share would suggest and vice versa.  Using this approach, Fuerst 
(2008) identified particular concentrations of LEED buildings in Washington D.C. and 
Oregon.  Focusing on the metropolitan areas rather than states, Simons, Choi and Simons 
(2009) also investigated the market penetration of Energy Star and LEED labeled buildings in 
US metropolitan areas.  Confirming previous research, compared to the retail sector, they find 
much higher levels of penetration in office markets both in relative and absolute terms.   With 
19 out of a total of 534 office buildings (3.53%), Hawaii was identified as having the highest 
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relative penetration of eco-labeled offices.  In absolute terms, Los Angeles was the largest 
market for eco-labeled offices with 244 from a total of 15,335 office buildings (1.59%). 
 
Fuerst (2009) also finds that the share of corporate clients and private developers relative to 
government bodies seeking LEED certification has increased steadily since its inception.  The 
share of private developers and corporate clients has increased considerably from 46% in the 
2000-02 to 60% in the most recent 2006-08 period.  The growth of the share of private 
developers from 3% to 26% is particularly notable as this indicates that certification appears 
to be seen as a valuable investment by an increasing number of developers.  Given the 
exponential growth of certified buildings described above, this trend becomes even more 
notable when considered on an absolute basis (i.e. number of projects certified for private 
developers in each period).  
 
Looking at the role of policy intervention in adoption, Kok, McGraw and Quigley (2011) 
examined trends in the number and volume of LEED and Energy Star certified buildings in 48 
US metropolitan areas for the period 1995-2010.  Their time series data on market size, rents, 
prices, vacancy rates for ‗competitive‘ buildings in the various markets was obtained from a 
private real estate research organization (CBRE-EA).  They suggested that the nature of the 
sampling created a selection bias resulting in an upward bias in the estimated penetration 
rates.  They found high penetration rates with Energy Star certified space accounting for 30% 
of the total office space (as monitored by CBRE-EA).  The corresponding figures for LEED 
space was 11% of all the office space.   
 
Hypothesizing that the market penetration would be a function of a blend of climatic, socio-
economic, real estate market and policy variables (including regulation and incentives), Kok, 
McGraw and Quigley (2011) first investigated which variables were significant at a cross-
sectional level.  They identified positive relationships between the penetration of eco-labeled 
buildings and income, size of real estate market, rental levels, energy prices, the presence of 
LEED accredited professionals, political allegiance and the presence of incentives.  They 
acknowledged the problem of small samples, provided no indication of statistical significance 
and were obviously aware of the distinctions between association and causation.  In order to 
test for the explanatory power of these variables more robustly, they also used multivariate 
econometric procedures to model the dynamic relationship between market penetration and 
metropolitan characteristics.  They found mixed and sometimes inconsistent results.  In most 
model specifications, they found that indicators of economic and real estate market vitality 
had a significantly positive relationship with market penetration.   Although they identified 
positive effects of LEED incentives, they omitted potentially important variables.  For 
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instance, in their model including local policies encouraging LEED, the potentially 
confounding factor of high income jointly causing policy and market adoption is not included.  
Further, it is not clear from the discussion how or whether they have accounted for another 
confounding factor - variation in the rate of new building.   
 
Focusing on California, Simcoe and Toffel (2011) investigated the effect of local municipal 
procurement policies on the adoption of LEED buildings and the growth of LEED-accredited 
professionals.  They used a Coarsened Exact Matching approach to identify a sample of 
matched controls which they then compared to policy adopters and their neighbors. They 
found that policy adopters tended to be larger, greener, richer and better educated than 
potential controls.  In policy adopters and the neighboring municipalities, they estimated an 
increase in LEED registered buildings of 84% and 69% respectively.  Using a difference-in-
difference (before-after) approach to model the dynamic relationship between policy adoption 
and LEED registrations, they concluded that there was no statistically significant difference 
between the adopters and control cities in the period prior to policy adoption.  However, they 
found that adopters gradually diverge in terms of LEED adoption following a policy change.  
This gradual divergence over a period of 2-4 years is consistent with development lags in new 
build.       
 
Choi (2010) examined the effect of different types of incentives (technical support, financial 
support and expedited administrative procedures) and policies (standards) on market 
penetration rates for 103 US cities.  Applying four model specifications on cross-sectional 
data, the presence of a regulatory requirement was consistently found to have had a positive 
effect on market penetration rates.  For the incentives, only expedited administrative 
procedures were found to have a significantly positive effect.  It is notable that income was 
only positive when a regulation dummy was omitted.  This suggests that the presence of a 
required standard and income are correlated.        
 
In the CSR literature,  Bansal and Roth (2000) proposed three types of motive profiles that 
can individually or together stimulate a higher level of CSR commitment - the caring profile, 
the competitive profile and the concerned profile. In the caring profile, it is a championing 
effort by organizational leadership which is the key driver of a firm‘s CSR commitment.  In 
the competitive profile, firms are motivated by straightforward direct business advantages 
such as reduced costs or improved revenues.  The concerned profile is characterized in terms 
of a pre-emptive, collective response by a group of market participants in an industry that 
allocates resources to CSR performance in order to obtain reputational benefits and/or 
reduced regulatory risks.  These contrasting motives illustrate some of the difficulties of 
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generalizing about socio-economic drivers of variations in penetration rates of LEED-
certified buildings.  In some cases, demand and supply may be linked to championing efforts 
mediated by local, political salience.  In other markets, demand may come from companies 
whose motivation is defensive.       
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Study Area and Data Sources 
 
The study area for our analysis includes 177 core based statistical areas (CBSA) in the United 
States. The CBSA was selected as the level of analysis to allow for the collection of data from 
diverse sources with common geographic boundaries. The CBSA also provides an appropriate 
level of analysis to estimate the effect of government regulations and incentives for eco-
labeled buildings on production.  
 
To analyze the effect of green building policies on market penetration, a database of 
regulations, incentives, and planning initiatives was created. The Green Building Regulation 
Database (GBRD) contains detailed information on green building policies for all 177 CBSAs 
included in the analysis. For each CBSA, the following information was gathered: 
 
 Green Building Standards – design standards relating to the attainment of an eco-
label certification (such as LEED); the applicability of the standard with respect to 
building size, type, and ownership (public or private); whether the standard was 
mandatory; the type and level of certification required; and the year adopted. 
 Green Building Incentive – any incentives relating to green building construction, 
including expedited permitting, fee reductions, etc.; the applicability of the incentive 
with respect to building size, type, and ownership (public or private); the type and 
level of certification required to qualify for the incentive; and the year adopted. 
 Sustainability Plan – any planning initiative or climate action plan that affects 
buildings, the type of real estate implicated, and the year adopted. 
 Energy Conservation and Renewable Energy – any incentive or requirement for 
energy conservation programs and/or renewable energy systems on buildings. 
 
The GBRD was developed using a three-step methodology. First, an online review of 
municipal planning, building, and sustainability agencies was conducted to determine the 
presence of the green building policies described above. Second, if a policy was indicated, a 
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the applicable building code, zoning code, or local law was comprehensively reviewed to 
collect the required policy information. Finally, where sufficient information could not be 
gathered (such as year of policy adoption, for instance), a survey of the relevant municipal 
planning, building, or sustainability official was conducted by phone and email. This process 
was conducted between January 2010 and February 2011. 
 
In addition, state-level policies where included in the database. These policies represent green 
building and energy efficiency regulations and incentives (tax incentives, subsidies, grants, 
municipal loans/bonds) offered by state governments. This information was collected from 
the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, a project of the North 
Carolina Solar Center and the Interstate Renewable Energy Council. 
 
Methodology 
 
Locational determinants have been studied in a number of sectors, from affordable housing 
(Freeman 2004; Oakley 2008; Rohe and Freeman 2001) to manufacturing and logistics 
facilities (Bartik 1985; Cheng and Stough 2006; Coughlin and Segev 2000; Smith and Florida 
1994). We would expect that the ―green‖ commercial real estate market share in a given city 
would be influenced by a number of factors, including economic conditions, climate, local 
real estate market conditions, the regulatory and political environment, demographic and 
socioeconomic variables, industry composition, and physical characteristics of the city and its 
commercial building stock. Eco-labeled building decisions would also tend to be driven by 
the extent of the eco-labeled building inventory that is already in place (DeCoster and Strange 
1993). This may occur for two reasons. First, developers would choose to build ―green‖ out of 
a fear of being at a competitive disadvantage to the existing supply of office space. Second, 
greater numbers of existing eco-labeled buildings in a particular city would suggest lower 
(additional) development costs for sustainable design elements, thus lower the marginal cost 
of an eco-labeled building vis‐à‐vis a traditional building.  
 
To estimate the locational determinants of eco-labeled buildings, we test three reduced-form 
model specifications using ordinary least squares, robust regression and fractional logit. The 
linear regression model specification is given by:  
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where the dependent variable (PL) is the proportion of LEED-certified office space (in sq.ft.) 
in a market at the end of 2010 and ε is the error term. The independent variables (and data 
sources) are:  
Economic Climate (ECON): gross metropolitan product (Bureau of Labor Statistics); 
Real Estate Market Conditions (RE): median price per square foot, median rental rate per 
square foot, vacancy rate (CoStar); 
Regulatory and Political Environment (RP): mayor‘s political party affiliation and margin of 
victory, eco-labeled building regulations/mandates (GBRD), government incentives for eco-
labeled building (GBRD).  
Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics (SE): median age, per capita income (year 
1995), per capita income growth (years 1995-2005), total population (year 1995), population 
growth (years 1995-2005), education level (U.S. Census); 
Industry Composition (IND): proportion in NAICS codes 23, 52, 53, 54, 55, and 92 
(financial sector, construction, and government) (Bureau of Labor Statistics);  
Physical Characteristics (BUILD): average building size, total commercial rentable square 
footage (CoStar), percent urbanized area, population density (population per square mile) 
(U.S. Census); 
Climate (CL): average annual temperature (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration), heating degree days (National Climatic Data Center), climate zone 
(ASHRAE), CO2 emissions per capita (NASA/Department of Energy). 
 
 
Robust regression  
 
An inspection of summary statistics reveals that our dataset contains a number of notable 
outliers both regarding the fraction of which might be influential in the estimation of 
coefficients. Further examination of leverage diagnostics such as the Cook‘s distance measure 
of the least squares estimations provides further evidence of influential outliers. To address 
this issue, we supplement the estimates from the OLS regression with robust regression. This 
method uses Huber and Tukey biweights to mitigate the impact of outliers on regressions 
coefficients in the estimation (Huber, 1964 and Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987). In this 
framework, outliers are defined via a Cook's distance measure which reflects the leverage of 
any given observation in the estimation process. All observations with Cook's distances larger 
than 1 obtain a zero weight in the estimation. Verardi and Croux (2009) express this  efficient 
M-estimator computed by robust regression in the following manner:    
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The iterative algorithm used in our specification follows a Huber (p) function with the 
following standard specification:  
 
Although this method of estimating robust regressions has not been without criticism  This is 
mainly because it does not completely control all bad leverage observations in empirical 
applications and is prone to missing potential clusters of outliers in some cases (see for 
example Rousseeuw and Van Zomeren, 1990).  However,  we use this technique as a 
reasonably reliable and simple robustness check of our coefficient estimates.  
 
 
Fractional logit estimation  
 
In addition to OLS and robust regression, we apply a fractional logit model to better account 
for the fact that the dependent variable is a non-negative value limited strictly at 100%.  
Initially proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), fractional logit models are better suited 
for modeling fractional dependent variables bounded by zero and one than other functional 
forms. A potential drawback of the least-squares estimation is that non-linearities in the data 
are ignored. The fractional response values predicted directly by quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimation (QMLE) lie within the unit interval. The conditional mean assumption of the 
dependent variable yi on covariates xi  are then 
 iE y Gi ix x β  
where G is the logistic CDF (Cumulative Distribution Function) and yii∈[0,1].  Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) assume a logistic distribution  
 
exp
1 exp
iE y
i
i
i
x β
x
x β
 
and propose the following Bernoulli log-likelihood function   
 ( ) log 1 log 1i i il y G y Gi iβ x β x β  
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to obtain consistent parameter estimates with QMLE.  The non-binary, non-normal response 
distribution assumed in fractional logit estimations, makes it suitable for modeling it with a 
Generalized Linear Models (GLM) framework.  
 
Treatment effects model  
 
A further concern in our analysis is a potential selectivity and/or endogeneity bias. If markets 
with a high percentage of green buildings are found to have more incentives and regulations 
in place that aim to promote the diffusion of green buildings in these markets, it is impossible 
to conclude – at least in a cross-sectional setting - whether the high percentage of green space 
preceded the existence of these policies. More importantly, this would seriously put into 
question the strong assumption of our single-equation models that the introduction of these 
policies is completely random and independent of the percentage of green commercial space 
in these markets (for a thorough discussion of selectivity and omitted-variable biases, see e.g. 
Achen 1986 and Imbens 2004) . It seems more plausible that markets where these policy 
measures are in place today already had particularly high (or possibly particularly low) 
percentages of green commercial space even before these policies were introduced. This 
selectivity bias would then bias the results upwards or downwards depending on whether 
these policies were introduced to a greater extent in either green or non-green markets.  
 
To address this issue, we estimate a two-stage treatment effects model which is a variation of 
the standard Heckman correction (see Heckman 1979). The specification takes the following 
form:  
 
Stage 1 
11XRP  
 
Stage 2 
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and X1 being a vector of explanatory characteristics that predicts which municipalities and 
other administrative units will adopt ‗green‘ policy measures. The first-stage is a maximum-
likelihood probit estimation of the binary policy variable in question. Evidently, some of the 
factors affecting the adoption of green space also affect the diffusion of green space and are 
therefore included in both stages. All other factors in the specification are assumed to be 
strictly exogenous. A further assumption is that the respective error terms of the equations, u 
and ε follow a bivariate normal distribution. We test the validity of this assumption using a 
Wald test for independent equations. The null hypothesis of this test is that the MLE first-
stage is independent of the structural equation of interest in the second stage.  
 
Summary Data 
 
This study draws on CoStar's comprehensive national database which includes approximately 
over 40 billion square feet of commercial space in more than two million properties making it 
the largest available real estate database in the United States. In an effort to provide details on 
the environmental performance of buildings, the CoStar Group began tagging LEED 
buildings around 2006.  This enables researchers to identify numbers and LEED certified 
buildings in the database. Data on the commercial real estate markets is displayed in Tables 1 
and 2.  Information on total commercial space (retail, industrial, office and flex) was obtained 
from the CoStar database and reflects to status quo as of end of 2010. 
 
Stock data were obtained for 177 Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA) in the US.  Our 
database covers a wide range of market sizes to test whether green buildings are in fact 
primarily a ‗big city‘ phenomenon.  The average quantity of commercial space in a CBSA is 
approximately 231 million square feet.  Both New York and Los Angeles have over 2 billion 
square feet of commercial space in over 100,000 buildings each.  Approximately 60% of the 
commercial space is in the largest 25 CBSA.  At the other end of the scale, there are nine 
CBSA with less than 10 million square feet.  There is some initial evidence to suggest that 
LEED-certified buildings tend to be concentrated in larger centers.  Of the total LEED-
labeled space (563 million square feet), 77% is located in the largest 25 CBSA.  The 
correlation coefficient between total commercial space and proportion of LEED-certified 
space is positive and statistically significant (0.22).  
 
It is important to acknowledge the problems associated with using the ratio of certified space 
to total commercial space in the analysis.  For instance, the ranking shows that Lexington, KY 
has the largest proportion of LEED space but this is mainly due to the existence of one large 
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certified industrial property (Toyota) with 7.7 million sq.ft. in an otherwise relatively small 
commercial market. Indeed, Lexington is below average in terms of the number of LEED 
buildings as a proportion of all buildings. In terms of floor space, the average proportion of 
LEED certified commercial floor space in the United States is small at 0.87%.  
 
 
Table 1:  LEED Space as a Proportion of Total Commercial Space: Top 25 All CBSA 
 
Rank CBSA Total bldgs LEED bldgs  LEED bldgs Total Floorspace Total LEED space LEED floorspace 
  N N % square feet square feet % 
1 LEXINGTON-FYET 4309 5 0.12% 90,091,299 8,007,440 8.89% 
2 AMES  241 2 0.83% 6,254,816 497,576 7.96% 
3 OLYMPIA  2196 14 0.64% 29,369,744 1,738,812 5.92% 
4 EUGENE-SPRFLD 14688 6 0.04% 17,418,735 694,653 3.99% 
5 DENVER 20806 93 0.45% 524,826,899 19,830,062 3.78% 
6 ANDERSON  871 1 0.11% 20,219,655 760,000 3.76% 
7 SEATTLE 28082 119 0.42% 657,388,530 24,584,211 3.74% 
8 WACO  929 1 0.11% 22,847,574 750,000 3.28% 
9 SAN FRANCISCO 48375 115 0.24% 923,333,765 29,805,797 3.23% 
10 BOSTON 30046 99 0.33% 864,004,380 27,827,078 3.22% 
11 WASHINGTON  33505 145 0.43% 957,889,304 30,134,464 3.15% 
12 AUGUSTA 4750 4 0.08% 68,171,965 2,079,811 3.05% 
13 SAVANNAH  2856 10 0.35% 59,718,174 1,666,900 2.79% 
14 RENO 4002 9 0.22% 111,350,354 3,095,805 2.78% 
15 MINNEAPOLIS 28744 78 0.27% 710,475,377 18,394,164 2.59% 
16 DALLAS 49107 92 0.19% 1,474,845,969 37,826,092 2.56% 
17 SACRAMENTO 18088 49 0.27% 376,798,258 9,626,524 2.55% 
18 HOUSTON 36270 88 0.24% 1,114,936,343 27,831,345 2.50% 
19 DURHAM  3452 17 0.49% 84,466,078 2,004,783 2.37% 
20 STOCKTON  3713 6 0.16% 112,663,091 2,662,260 2.36% 
21 PORTLAND 19917 91 0.46% 410,025,616 9,167,621 2.24% 
22 CHICAGO 64258 138 0.21% 2,106,143,296 46,404,869 2.20% 
23 BEND  1063 9 0.85% 15,655,974 323,785 2.07% 
24 LANSING 6875 4 0.06% 104,090,274 2,033,000 1.95% 
25 ATLANTA 46359 88 0.19% 1,247,363,020 24,054,386 1.93% 
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Table 2:  LEED Space as a Proportion of Total Commercial Space; Top 25 Large CBSA  
CBSAs over 100 million sq ft only 
 
Rank CBSA 
Total 
bldgs LEED bldgs  
LEED 
bldgs 
Total 
Floorspace 
Total LEED 
Floorspace 
LEED 
Floorspace 
  N N % square feet square feet % 
1 DENVER 20,806 93 0.45% 524,826,899 19,830,062 3.78% 
2 SEATTLE 28,082 119 0.42% 657,388,530 24,584,211 3.74% 
3 SAN FRANCISCO 48,375 115 0.24% 923,333,765 29,805,797 3.23% 
4 BOSTON 30,046 99 0.33% 864,004,380 27,827,078 3.22% 
5 WASHINGTON 33,505 145 0.43% 957,889,304 30,134,464 3.15% 
6 RENO 4,002 9 0.22% 111,350,354 3,095,805 2.78% 
7 MINNEAPOLIS 28,744 78 0.27% 710,475,377 18,394,164 2.59% 
8 DALLAS  49,107 92 0.19% 1,474,845,969 37,826,092 2.56% 
9 SACRAMENTO 18,088 49 0.27% 376,798,258 9,626,524 2.55% 
10 HOUSTON 36,270 88 0.24% 1,114,936,343 27,831,345 2.50% 
11 STOCKTON  3,713 6 0.16% 112,663,091 2,662,260 2.36% 
12 PORTLAND  19,917 91 0.46% 410,025,616 9,167,621 2.24% 
13 CHICAGO 64,258 138 0.21% 2,106,143,296 46,404,869 2.20% 
14 LANSING 6,875 4 0.06% 104,090,274 2,033,000 1.95% 
15 ATLANTA 46,359 88 0.19% 1,247,363,020 24,054,386 1.93% 
16 ALLENTOWN  5,792 14 0.24% 166,382,341 2,945,525 1.77% 
17 SAN JOSE 17,989 41 0.23% 421,148,233 7,377,925 1.75% 
18 CHARLOTTE 17,466 27 0.15% 425,157,646 7,418,582 1.74% 
19 BALTIMORE 19,795 56 0.28% 483,283,085 7,776,553 1.61% 
20 LOS ANGELES 109,744 159 0.14% 2,406,005,038 37,548,882 1.56% 
21 SAN DIEGO 27,775 66 0.24% 463,095,975 7,130,443 1.54% 
22 PHOENIX-MESA 28,615 44 0.15% 679,063,315 9,601,971 1.41% 
23 NEW YORK 119,846 115 0.10% 2,932,995,228 35,953,792 1.23% 
24 GRAND RAPID 9,624 41 0.43% 202,163,029 2,470,264 1.22% 
25 RIVERSIDE 32,604 37 0.11% 766,436,510 8,978,284 1.17% 
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For large CBSAs only, there are only five centers where LEED-certified space is over 3% of 
the total.  Bearing in mind that confirmation bias due to preconceived theories makes it risky 
to draw inferences from these descriptive statistics, some preliminary observations can be 
made.  The high ranking of west coast liberal cities such as Seattle, Portland and San 
Francisco is notable.   On the east coast, a similar explanation may reflect Boston‘s high 
position.  It is possible that the high position of Denver, Dallas and Houston may be linked to 
the economic importance of oil, gas and mining companies to their respective local 
economies – companies that typically value image benefits.  On the other hand, Washington‘s 
position may be due to the procurement policies of government agencies.  If nothing else, this 
rather speculative induction serves to highlight the complex range of factors that can 
determine differences in the diffusion of LEED certified buildings.  The 25 CBSA with the 
lowest proportion of LEED certified space all have no LEED certified space.  They tend to be 
small CBSA.  Their average number of buildings is 1579 compared to the sample average of 
nearly 10,700.  Typically, they have only 10% of the floor space of the average CBSA.  
 
Results 
 
In the next step, we seek to identify the major drivers of green commercial markets as 
reflected in the percentage of LEED-certified commercial floor space using three regression 
model specifications. To wit, we test whether there is any statistically significant association 
between the presence of incentives, frameworks and regulations and the proportion of LEED-
certified commercial floor space in the market along with a series of other characteristics.  
Table 3 reports the results of these three single equation models. Across all models, there is a 
highly statistically significant positive association between market size and market 
penetration of LEED-certified buildings confirming the previously described large-market 
bias (see Burr 2008). The greater proportion of LEED- certified space in large cities may be 
due to a number of factors ranging from knowledge spillovers, imitation through observation, 
social learning to higher demand from large corporate tenants and greater versatility of large 
markets to respond to innovations. We also find that a negative impact of almost all climate 
zone compared to markets in Climate Zone 1 (South Florida).  A notable exception is Climate 
Zone 7, which is also one of the more extreme climate zones.  This seems plausible since the 
economic returns of LEED-certification, particularly in terms of energy efficiency1, are likely 
to be higher in less moderate, i.e. tropical and arctic climates.  
 
                                                 
1 Fuerst and McAllister (2011) report that their comprehensive dataset of green buildings contains 
nearly twice as much dual-certified space (i..e. both LEED and Energy Star certification) than LEED-
only certified space.  
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Table 3  Single Equation Model Results 
 
 OLS model
1 
Robust 
Regression 
Fractional logit   
       
Constant 0.54  -0.44 ** -5.00 *** 
Market size 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
CO2 emissions psf -0.63 ** -11.69 
 -4.00 *** 
Climate zone 1 Omitted  Omitted  Omitted  
Climate zone 2 -0.88 * 0.18  -0.78 ** 
Climate zone 3 -0.96 ** 0.15  -0.88 *** 
Climate zone 4 -0.87 * 0.08  -0.73 ** 
Climate zone 5 -0.50  0.36 *** -0.50 * 
Climate zone 6 -1.09 ** 0.25 * -1.02 *** 
Climate zone 7 -0.35  0.99 *** 0.28  
Employment growth 2001-08 3.86 ** 4.47 *** 2.89 ** 
% public sector 2008 2.66  0.09  0.56  
% financial sector 2008 -5.49  1.33  -1.64  
% of population with degree 7.56 *** 1.99 *** 5.89 *** 
Average electricity price -0.08 *** -0.01  -0.91 *** 
Required -0.11  0.08  -0.09  
Incentive -0.18  0.04  -0.10  
Greenplan -0.13  -0.13 * -0.65  
Greenbuilding -0.24  -0.02  -0.28  
Tax incentive 0.10  -0.08  0.21  
Democratic mayor -0.14  -0.06  0.01  
Republican mayor -0.17  0.04  -0.03  
Independent mayor Omitted  Omitted  Omitted  
       
n 174  n 174 n 174 
F(21, 148) 11.67  F(21, 147) 17.54 
Log 
pseudo-
likelihood -6.83 
Prob F 0.00  Prob F 0.00   
R-squared 0.33      
       
 
***  significant at 1% level 
**  significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
Policy variables   
Required =  city-level mandatory green building standard (e.g. LEED is required for new buildings)  
Incentive=  city-level green building incentive (e.g. expedited permitting, fee reductions for green)  
Green plan = city-level sustainability or climate action plan  
Greenbuilding = State-level green building program 
Tax incentive -> State-level tax incentives (personal, corporate, or property) 
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A somewhat counterintuitive finding is the significant negative impact of CO2 emissions per 
sq.ft. of commercial space, implying that commercial markets with a larger carbon footprint 
tend to have a higher percentage of green buildings. However, a more focused analysis would 
be required to confirm the validity of this finding. Another consistent result across all of the 
single equation models is a significantly positive association between employment growth 
over the last decade and market penetration of LEED-certified buildings.  In the absence of 
data on new supply of commercial floor space, employment growth should provide a good 
proxy for economic vitality and a reasonable proxy for the relative level of new supply.  It 
may not be unexpected that markets with greater growth in the workforce and/or supply of 
space also tended to have higher levels of LEED-certified space.  At the extreme, a lack of 
demand may mean no new stock which would preclude new LEED-certified stock and stall 
the certification of existing stock.  The proportion of the population with a degree, another 
indication of economic vitality, also has a consistent and statistically significant positive 
association with penetration levels.  Consistent with previous research, cities with a larger 
percentage of highly educated and wealthy inhabitants tend to be greener.  It is notable that 
the economic composition variables (% employed in public sector, % employed in financial 
sector) do not appear to have a significant effect on market penetration.  This may simply 
reflect the diversity of motives of market participants.  Further, political affiliation has no 
direct significant impact on levels of LEED-certified commercial space. 
 
Turning to the variables of interest, there is no evidence from any of the single equation 
models of a positive association between policies to promote the development of LEED-
certified buildings. Indeed, the adoption of a Green Plan has a statistically significant negative 
effect in one of the models.  However, in general, there is no statistically significant effect of 
any of the policy measures.  This does not preclude the possibility of ‗before-after‘ effects 
that cannot be captured in this cross-sectional framework.  Where policies have been put into 
place only recently, they may not yet have had sufficient opportunity to influence the 
behavior of market participants and supply outcomes.  
 
However, these single-equation results may be plagued by a potential endogeneity and sample 
selection bias as pointed out above. We address this issue with a series of two-stage treatment 
effects models. The resulting modeling estimates are displayed in Tables A2-A6. The 
vulnerability of these models to identification and specification problems is well documented 
in the extant literature (see for example Little and Rubin, 1987). A particularly crucial step in 
specifying a valid model is thus to justify the exclusion restrictions from the first stage. In the 
present study, economic theory provides little guidance for excluding variables contained in 
the choice model (first stage) in the outcome model (second stage). Hence, we include factors 
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in the first stage that are expected to have an impact on the policy treatment variable and  
little or no direct impact on the proportion of LEED space in a market. Since it cannot be 
ruled out that many of the factors affecting the adoption of green policies also impact upon 
the supply of green buildings, we circumvent this problem by including factors in both stages 
or matching relevant first-stage regressors with similar but more directly related market 
measures that exhibit low correlation with the first stage regressors. An example of the latter 
is the CO2  per capita variable in the first stage which is matched with a variable measuring 
CO2 emissions per sq.ft of commercial space in the second stage. Average electricity price is 
included in both equations as an explanatory variable. Size is expected to matter in both 
equations but is measured differently in each equation, i.e. as the number of inhabitants in the 
policy equation and as inventory of commercial space in the LEED proportion equation. 
Educational attainment is expected to impact directly only on the policy variable based on the 
assumption that higher levels of education are associated with more support for 
environmental regulations as shown in previous empirical studies (e.g. Kahn 2002). It is only 
assumed to impact upon the fraction of green commercial space more indirectly via the 
second-stage socio-economic variables. Political variables, i.e. mayor's affiliation, was only 
included in the first-stage policy equation. 
 
The likelihood-ratio test for the independence of equations shows for three of the five 
measured policy variables that there is significant evidence of selectivity. This may be an 
indication that the previously reported single-equation results were biased and that the 
treatment effects estimates are preferable. Consistent with the results of the single equation 
models, the presence of a Green Plan and tax incentives has a statistically significant negative 
association with the proportion of LEED-certified buildings in a metropolitan area. A time-
series analysis of these factors is required to disentangle the dynamics of and interaction 
between these factors. However, the treatment effects models do confirm a statistically 
significant association between the presence of city-level green building incentives (e.g. 
expedited permitting or fee reductions for green projects) and the proportion of LEED-
certified buildings in a market.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Since the environmental performance of the existing stock is critical, there has been 
increasing adoption of policy instruments that are attempting to increase the market diffusion 
of buildings with superior environmental performance. Consistent with many policy 
interventions in other policy areas, typical measures have involved a blend of economic 
rewards (such as tax benefits, subsidies), information provision, preferred procurement, 
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technical assistance and regulatory requirements.  The most problematic issue in this line of 
research is fundamentally concerned with endogeneity and/or selection bias.  Essentially, the 
same characteristics of markets that adopt LEED-certified buildings at a higher rate may also 
be causing the same markets to adopt policies that promote LEED-certified buildings.  It is 
not clear that previous research has controlled sufficiently for this joint causality problem. 
 
Our results suggest that, when variations in economic vitality, climate zone and market size 
are taken into account, there is only very limited support for the hypothesis that 'green' 
policies have a significant positive effect on green building adoption in the current market. 
Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study, it is possible that this may simply be a product 
of the timing of policy adoption.  There is clearly scope for robust ‗before-after‘ research on 
the effects of policy intervention using appropriate econometric techniques such as a 
difference in differences (DID) approach or more advanced panel analysis methods. In 
addition, the tendency of large cities to have higher proportions of LEED-certified buildings 
may be due to spatial clustering effects due to concentrations of exemplars and knowledge 
externalities.  This introduces scope to research on the spatial diffusion of LEED-certified 
buildings both over time and over space. 
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Appendix  
 
A1 Definitions of policy variables   
Policy variables   
Required =  city-level mandatory green building standard (e.g. LEED is required for new 
buildings)  
Incentive=  city-level green building incentive (e.g. expedited permitting, fee reductions for 
green)  
Green plan = city-level sustainability or climate action plan  
Greenbuilding = State-level green building program 
Tax incentive -> State-level tax incentives (personal, corporate, or property) 
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Table A2  Treatment Effect Model Results for Tax Incentives 
 
ML Treatment Effects Model  
Tax incentives   
   
Stage 1   
   
Constant 0.03  
CO2 per capita -0.01  
Population 2005 -0.01  
Democratic mayor -0.11  
Republican mayor -0.14  
Average electricity price -0.07 ** 
% of population with 
degree -6.03 *** 
 
   
Stage 2   
   
Constant -0.01  
Market size 0.01 *** 
Vacancy rate 3.16  
GDP per capita 0.02  
CO2 emissions psf -1.51  
Climate zone 1 Omitted  
Climate zone 2 -1.27 *** 
Climate zone 3 -1.26 *** 
Climate zone 4 -1.25 *** 
Climate zone 5 -0.72 ** 
Climate zone 6 -1.09 *** 
Climate zone 7 -0.94  
Employment growth 2001-
08 4.2 ** 
% public sector 2008 5.03 *** 
% financial sector 2008 -2.42  
% of population with 
degree 0.08 *** 
Average electricity price -0.12 ** 
   
Tax incentives -2.07 *** 
   
Log likelihood -366.1 
Wald chi2         127  
Prob >chi2       0.000 
N                       174   
LR test of indep eqns 31.16 *** (0.000) 
 
***  significant at 1% level 
**  significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
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Table A3 Treatment Effect Model Results for Green Building 
 
ML Treatment Effects Model
 
 
Green Building   
   
Stage 1   
   
Constant 0.79 ** 
CO2 per capita 0.05  
Population 2005 -0.01 * 
Democratic mayor -0.36 * 
Republican mayor 0.56  
Average electricity price 0.46 * 
% of population with degree 2.31  
   
Stage 2   
   
Constant 0.88  
Market size 0.01 *** 
Vacancy rate 2.58  
GDP per capita 0.01 *** 
CO2 emissions psf 1.29  
Climate zone 1 Omitted  
Climate zone 2 -1.20 *** 
Climate zone 3 -1.31 *** 
Climate zone 4 -1.07 *** 
Climate zone 5 -0.65 * 
Climate zone 6 -.97 ** 
Climate zone 7 -.86  
Employment growth 2001-08 2.4 * 
% public sector 2008 1.91 *** 
% financial sector 2008 6.42  
Average electricity price -0.12 ** 
   
Green Building 1.28  
   
Wald chi2         81.05  
Prob >chi2       0.000 
N                       174 
LR test of indep eqns      0.01  (0.95)   
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Table A4 Treatment Effect Model Results for Green Plan 
 
ML Treatment Effects Model
 
 
Green Plan   
   
Stage 1   
   
Constant 0.16 ** 
CO2 per capita 0.11 * 
Population 2005 0.01  
Democratic mayor 0.44 ** 
Republican mayor 0.53 ** 
Average electricity price 0.03  
% of population with degree -4.31 *** 
   
Stage 2   
   
Constant 0.52  
Market size 0.01 *** 
Vacancy rate 3.37  
GDP per capita 0.04 *** 
CO2 emissions psf -0.69  
Climate zone 1 Omitted  
Climate zone 2 -0.93 ** 
Climate zone 3 -1.16 *** 
Climate zone 4 -1.08 *** 
Climate zone 5  -0.48  
Climate zone 6 -0.84 ** 
Climate zone 7 -0.28  
Employment growth 2001-08 3.81 * 
% public sector 2008 6.55 *** 
% financial sector 2008 -7.81  
Average electricity price 0.03  
   
Green Plan -2.13 *** 
   
Wald chi2         90.21  
Prob >chi2       0.000 
N                       174   
LR test of indep eqns 6.18*** (0.01) 
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Table A5 Treatment Effect Model Results for Incentive 
 
 
ML Treatment Effects Model
 
 
Incentive    
   
Stage 1   
   
Constant -1.05 * 
CO2 per capita -0.01  
Population 2005 0.01  
Democratic mayor 0.03  
Republican mayor 0.04  
Average electricity price 0.02  
% of population with degree -4.14 *** 
   
Stage 2   
   
Constant 0.42  
Market size 0.01 * 
Vacancy rate 3.29  
GDP per capita 0.19  
CO2 emissions psf -0.21  
Climate zone 1 Omitted  
Climate zone 2 -1.13 *** 
Climate zone 3 -1.37 *** 
Climate zone 4 -1.23 *** 
Climate zone 5 -.82 *** 
Climate zone 6 1.17 *** 
Climate zone 7 -.67  
Employment growth 2001-08 3.51  
% public sector 2008 4.14 ** 
% financial sector 2008 -4.81  
Average electricity price -0.05  
   
Incentive 1.81 *** 
   
Wald chi2         108.62  
Prob >chi2       0.000 
N                       174   
LR test of indep eqns 16.05*** (0.00) 
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Table A6 Treatment Effect Model Results for Required 
 
 
 
ML Treatment Effects Model
 
  
Required
 
  
 
 
 
 
Stage 1   
   
Constant 0.90 * 
CO2 per capita -0.10  
Population 2005 0.01  
Democratic mayor 0.03  
Republican mayor 0.04  
Average electricity price 0.06  
% of population with degree -5.25  
   
Stage 2   
   
Constant 0.42  
Market size 0.01 *** 
Vacancy rate 2.44  
GDP per capita 0.03 *** 
CO2 emissions psf -0.74  
Climate zone 1 Omitted  
Climate zone 2 -1.11 *** 
Climate zone 3 -1.21 *** 
Climate zone 4 -1.0 *** 
Climate zone 5 -0.52  
Climate zone 6 -0.85 * 
Climate zone 7 -0.75  
Employment growth 2001-08 4.24 * 
% public sector 2008 7.23 *** 
% financial sector 2008 -8.91  
Average electricity price -0.09 *** 
   
Required 0.64  
   
Wald chi2         63.31  
Prob >chi2       0.000 
N                       174   
LR test of indep eqns 1.16 (0.28) 
 
  
 
